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EMBRACE THE SEC 
 
Usha R. Rodrigues* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Securities law traditionally only permits corporations that have 
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
completed an initial public offering (IPO) to sell equity to the general 
public—often a long, expensive process.  Initial coin offering (ICOs) 
emerged in 2013 as a fundraising tool for non-public blockchain-based 
companies to raise billions of dollars while circumventing the SEC and 
public offering process altogether.  But their early success brought the 
attention of the SEC, and in 2017 the SEC asserted the right to regulate 
ICOs.  Since then, U.S. ICO promoters have struggled to avoid the SEC’s 
assertion of jurisdiction, contorting their offerings in an effort to avoid 
regulation.  They have largely failed.  This piece argues that government 
regulation is a feature, not a bug for ICOs.  If ICO entrepreneurs 
acknowledge SEC jurisdiction—and if the SEC, for its part, implements 
creative mechanisms to protect investors—blockchain businesses can raise 
capital from the general public while continuing to serve the underlying 
goals of U.S. securities law.       
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
An initial coin offering (ICO) is an offering of specialized crypto tokens, 
or “coins,” that operate on a blockchain, with the promise that those tokens 
will operate as the medium of exchange on a digital platform that may exist 
at the time of offering or be developed in the future.
1
 The funds raised in the 
 
 
* M.E. Kilpatrick Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.  I thank Joan 
Heminway, Dave Hoffman, Don Langevoort, and David Wishnick.  Mistakes are my own. 
1. Thomas Bourveau, Emmanuel T. De George, Atif Ellahie & Daniele Macciocchi, 
Information Intermediaries in the Crypto-Tokens Market 7-8 (Working Paper 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3193392 [https://perma.cc/P89N-ZVM2]. 
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ICO are used to continue to develop the blockchain technology.  Typically, 
entrepreneurs offer their coins in exchange for existing currencies such as 
Bitcoin, but they can also be sold for fiat currency, such as U.S. dollars or 
British pounds.
2
    
The wild success of early ICOs fueled an entire ecosystem of blockchain 
startups eager to build their own blockchain or blockchain-based application 
to create value and, in the course of doing so, raise a lot of money from the 
general public.  In July 2013, MasterCoin (now known as Omni Layer
3
), 
launched what is regarded as the first ICO,
4
 which raised about $500,000 in 
bitcoin.
5
  Ethereum, an early ICO success story, raised about $18 million in 
bitcoin.
6
 Similar early successes led the way for the ICO explosion that 
occurred in 2017.
7
 ICOs raised about $5.6 billion in 2017,
8
 through more 
than nine hundred sales.
9
 
The ICO acronym may sound like an initial public offering (IPO), but in 
reality ICOs are more like anti-IPOs.  There are two traditional methods of 
raising capital through the sale of securities: 1) to register those securities 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in an IPO, which costs 
millions of dollars and takes months to accomplish, and then offer the shares 
to the general public; or 2) to find an exemption from registration 
requirements that involves selling the shares privately.  ICOs thus offered a 
radical break from the past—a way to tap general public funding without 
the cost and delay of an IPO.   
 
 
2. Kennedy K. Luvai, The End of the ICO Gold Rush? The Regulatory Squeeze on Token 
Offerings as a Funding Mechanism for Blockchain-Related Ventures, 31 UTAH B. J. 20, 20 (2018). 
3. Laura Shin, Here’s the Man Who Created ICOs and This is the New Token He’s Backing, 
FORBES (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2017/09/21/heres-the-man-who-
created-icos-and-this-is-the-new-token-hes-backing/#3c7ede861183 [https://perma.cc/3HZC-3FS2]. 
4. Chance Barnett, Inside the Meteoric Rise of ICOs, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2017, 1:21 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2017/09/23/inside-the-meteoric-rise-of-icos/ 
[https://perma.cc/4MN5-KNVQ]. 
5. Shin, supra note 3. 
6. Philip, Initial Coin Offering: Ethereum, COINSTAKER (Apr. 18, 2017), 
https://www.coinstaker.com/initial-coin-offering/ethereum/ [https://perma.cc/N9FA-H2SD]. 
7. Barnett, supra note 4. 
8. Oscar Williams-Grut, Only 48% of ICOs Were Successful Last Year — but Startups Still 
Managed to Raise $5.6 Billion, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 31, 2018, 1:44 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-much-raised-icos-2017-tokendata-2017-2018-
1[https://perma.cc/T4FR-WHKZ]. 
9. Kai Sedgwick, 46% of Last Year’s ICOs Have Failed Already, BITCOIN NEWS (Feb. 23, 
2018), http://news.bitcoin.com/46-last-years-icos-failed-already/ [https://perma.cc/9YC2-65ZA]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/12
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This innovative type of public offering has rapidly evolved without the 
blessing of U.S. regulators.  Indeed, regulators have proved deeply 
suspicious of ICOs, because their early success also attracted fraudsters.
10
 
As this article will describe, the earliest ICOs simply ignored the prospect 
of running afoul of securities laws, advising would-be investors to consult 
an attorney.  After the SEC’s July 2017 report on a blockchain-based 
organization called the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (“DAO 
Report”),
11
 which labeled a defunct token a security, ICO issuers turned to 
a familiar argument for evading the reach of U.S. securities law: they argued 
that their offerings were not securities at all.  
As a brief sidebar, the Howey test enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
1946 created a powerful catchall category for securities.
12
  As the next 
Section will describe in greater detail, U.S. securities law imposes numerous 
restrictions on the purchase and sale of securities.  One method of evading 
these restrictions is to argue that one is not in fact selling securities, and thus 
need not comply with the law.  Howey imposed a functional, multi-factor 
test that has swept up all manner of unlikely investments (earthworms,
13
 
payphones
14
) as securities.   ICOs are but the latest example of creative 
attempts to structure offerings to evade Howey.   
After the DAO Report suggested that tokenholders’ voting rights were 
part of what made the offering a security, some subsequent ICO promoters 
stripped the offerings of governance and ownership features, and 
characterized them as mere tokens meant for consumption (so-called utility 
tokens or consumption tokens), rather than investment contracts over which 
the SEC could legitimately claim jurisdiction under the Howey test.15  By 
 
 
10. A Wall Street Journal study of 1,450 ICOs revealed 271 with signs of fraud including 
“plagiarized investor documents, promises of guaranteed returns and missing or fake executive teams.” 
Shane Shifflett & Coulter Jones, Hundreds of Cryptocurrencies Show Hallmarks of Fraud, WALL 
STREET J., May 18, 2018, at A1. 
11. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 81207, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 21(a) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO (2017), https://www. 
sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf [https://perma.cc/E26H-HXBM].  
12. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
13. Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 1979). 
14. SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004). 
15. James J. Park, When Are Tokens Securities? Some Questions from the Perplexed, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 13, 2019, 4:05 PM), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/12/20/when-are-tokens-securities-some-questions-from-the-
perplexed/ [https://perma.cc/SV6X-UH4X]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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analogy, imagine a musician who sells tickets to a future concert well in 
advance in order to raise money for the venue and cost of production.  ICO 
issuers have good reason to try to claim the tokens and coins they sell are 
not securities: buyers of unregistered securities sold without an exemption 
from the Securities Exchange Act of 1933’s registration requirement are 
entitled to rescission—that is, a refund of the full purchase price.
16
   
The problem is that Howey’s definition of an investment contract is 
capacious.   The SEC has made good use of the authority that Howey grants 
it, insistently asserting its authority over ICOs and consistently rejecting the 
utility token workaround.  Regulators and good-faith ICO fundraisers thus 
appear to be at an impasse.  The SEC is charged with a tripartite mission: to 
protect investors; to maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and to 
facilitate capital formation.
17
 Right now, the investor protection mandate is 
steering the agency’s policy.  From the SEC’s perspective, there have been 
too many fraudulent ICOs, and more importantly, the risk of fraud in these 
public offerings is considerable.  On the other side, good-faith ICO 
fundraisers have either twisted their offerings into sub-optimal knots to 
avoid issuing “securities,” or are moving offshore.  There are two downsides 
here.  First, the United States is stifling an innovative and less costly 
technique to raise capital—one that, what’s more, allows the general public 
a crack at investments traditionally reserved only for the wealthy.  Second, 
by discouraging entrepreneurs interested in following the rules, they are 
creating a situation where the only ICO offerings that do go forth are, in 
fact, fraudulent.  
This article seeks to persuade the blockchain community that what it 
really needs to offer the general public is a security.  The Howey test is 
friend, not foe.  Rather than bringing undesirable government regulation, 
acknowledging the offering of a security allows the public a chance to 
participate in investment gains and take advantage of protective 
mechanisms like a vote.  A regulated offering, in other words, is far more 
attractive to the general public, not only by virtue of the imprimatur of the 
SEC, but also because regulation unlocks the possibility of the familiar 
protections investors enjoy with equity stock offerings.  Ideally, at the same 
 
 
16. Securities Exchange Act of 1933 § 12(a)(1), 15 U.S.C § 77l (2012). 
17. The requirement that the SEC consider a rule's effect on capital formation, efficiency, and 
competition was not added until 1996. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 24 (1996). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/12
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time, regulators would be open to ways to structure these offerings that 
would comport with the goals of securities law—and would acknowledge 
that it is worthwhile to think through ways technology can lower the cost of 
capital raising and broaden the investment opportunities for average 
Americans.  This article will describe the problem and outlines a solution—
an escrow—that could provide both investor protection and reassurance to 
honest ICO promoters.  
 
I. THE PUBLIC DESIRE FOR SECURITIES, NOT UTILITY TOKENS 
 
Many in the crypto-community have no interest in governmental 
regulation of any kind.  Indeed, the main attraction of the blockchain for 
some is its ability to circumvent governmental influence entirely.  We’ve 
seen this story before, in the early days of the internet, when John Perry 
Barlow and others advocated for a libertarian cyberspace free from 
governance by the ruling bodies of the physical world.
18
 The blockchain 
story has so far played out in a similar fashion, with governments inexorably 
asserting their sovereignty over the blockchain.
19
 The aim of this Section is 
to convince the community that their efforts to evade SEC regulation by 
way of utility tokens are misguided and self-defeating.  Before making that 
case, let’s examine how we got here. 
U.S. securities laws are disclosure-based.  Neither the federal nor the state 
government purport to guarantee investors that they will make money, or 
even not lose money.  Instead, the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act address three basic concerns.  The first is the risk 
that the sellers of securities are crooks from the outset, looking to take the 
money and run.
20
  The second is the risk that, once the securities have been 
sold and are trading on a secondary market, the insiders commit fraud or fail 
to disclose an adequate amount of information.
21
 The third concern is to 
foster markets and investment by creating a system of standardized 
 
 
18. Andrea Slane, Tales, Techs, and Territories: Private International Law, Globalization, and 
the Legal Construction of Borderlessness on the Internet, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 133 (2008). 
19. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF 
A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006). 
20. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 303-04 (1991). 
21. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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disclosure that enables investors to make informed decisions on a level 
playing field. Unlike the first two concerns, which focus on risks, this third 
consideration focuses on encouraging prosperity of the system.
22
 
The Securities Act has given rise to an elegant mechanism to ensure 
against the first concern, fraud in the initial offering: it puts the deep pockets 
and reputation of investment banks on the hook.
23
   Entrepreneurs must 
register with the SEC before going public, a lengthy and expensive process 
that helps ensure that investors have a sufficient quantity of information 
before sale.
24
  By assigning underwriters and experts with strict liability for 
misstatements in a prospectus, subject to a limited due diligence defense, 
the securities laws effectively deputize the investment banks conducting an 
offering to police the prospectus for fraud.
25
 As to the second concern, once 
public, the securities laws subject public companies to ongoing reporting 
requirements of increasingly large magnitude, ensuring that post-IPO 
purchasers of securities are kept well informed.  These disclosures occur at 
regular intervals (supplemented with updates as needed), and follow a 
standard formula, ensuring investors can assess risks uniformly. 
ICOs have rapidly grown in popularity and viability as a fundraising tool.  
In 2016, ICOs raised $240 million.
26
 In 2017, they raised $5.6 billion.
27
  In 
2018, they raised even more.
28
  As ICOs have become more common, the 
SEC has consistently, and stridently, asserted its authority to regulate them.  
 
 
22. See id. Scholars have debated justifications for mandatory disclosure for decades.  Some 
scholars argue that voluntary disclosure suffices, because sellers have an incentive to disclose 
information to prospective buyers.  A key justification for mandatory disclosure, in response to this “the 
market will provide” argument, is that requiring standardized disclosures makes it easier for investors 
to compare offerings, benefiting both sellers and investors. See Colleen Honigsberg, Robert J. Jackson, 
Jr., & Yu-Ting Forester Wong, Mandatory Disclosure and Individual Investors: Evidence from the Jobs 
Act, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 293, 293 (2015)   
23. See Merritt B. Fox, Regulating Public Offerings of Truly New Securities: First Principles, 
66 DUKE L.J. 673, 688-89 (2016) (discussing market mechanisms that have arisen to cure information 
asymmetries in IPOs, namely investment bank intermediation). 
24. Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding and Online Auction IPOs, 2015 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 217, 225. 
25. Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1636 (2010). 
26. Williams-Grut, supra note 8.    
27. Id. 
28. How much more is a subject of some debate.  See Justina Lee, How Much Have ICOs Raised 
in 2018? Depends on Who You Ask, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 4, 2018, 6:00 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-05/how-much-have-token-sales-raised-in-2018-
depends-on-who-you-ask [https://perma.cc/QYK5-6AGN]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/12
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While some ICOs simply defy U.S. regulators, many others are trying to 
evade its reach.  This Part will first describe those evasive efforts, and then 
make the case for an approach that concedes the SEC’s jurisdiction and 
works within the established framework for U.S. securities. 
 
II. ICO ATTEMPTS TO EVADE SEC REGULATION 
 
Currently, most ICOs are launched by an organization or group of 
developers.
29
  Some are traditional business entities or nonprofits.
30
  Others, 
like the 2016 DAO, are not formally organized at all.
31
  In the absence of 
affirmative guidance or regulation, no two ICOs look exactly alike; the 
design of an ICO is determined solely by the team behind a certain 
blockchain project.
32
 They have taken various paths with regard to securities 
laws.  Some have openly flouted the SEC—and the SEC has taken an 
increasingly active role in actions against them.
33
  Others have tried to evade 
the reach of U.S. securities laws in three ways.  First, some ICOs have tried 
to bar would-be investors from the United States from participating, in the 
 
 
29. Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and 
the Democratization of Public Capital Markets 18 (Cardozo L. Stud. Res. Paper No. 527, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3048104. 
30. See, e.g., Michael del Castillo, SEC Files ‘Emergency’ Restraining Order Against $1.7 
Billion Telegram ICO, FORBES (Oct. 13, 2019, 3:45 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2019/10/11/sec-files-emergency-restraining-order-
against-17-billion-telegram-ico/#171bdc0e29cb [https://perma.cc/HY55-SEPW]; Joseph Maurice, Top 
7 ICOs for Non-Profits to Watch in 2018, DISRUPTOR DAILY (Oct. 13, 2019, 3:55 PM), 
https://www.disruptordaily.com/top-7-biggest-icos-for-non-profits-to-watch-in-2018/ 
[https://perma.cc/HK7V-9R7V]. 
31. Zug, a small canton in Switzerland, has been home to a disproportionate number of ICOs, 
leading to its unofficial title of “Crypto Valley.” Ralph Atkins, Switzerland Embraces Cryptocurrency 
Culture, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/c2098ef6-ff84-11e7-9650-
9c0ad2d7c5b5 [https://perma.cc/YDC5-NBY8]. 
32. Ameer Rosic, What is an Initial Coin Offering? Raising Millions in Seconds, BLOCKGEEKS 
(2017), https://blockgeeks.com /guides/initial-coin-offering/ [https://perma.cc/8TAK-WYCJ]. 
33. See, e.g., SEC v. PlexCorps, No. 1:17-cv-07007, 2017 WL 6398722 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 
2017) (granting a preliminary order and asset freeze against Dominic LaCroix and his owned entities for 
likely violation of securities laws); Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Exposes Two Initial Coin 
Offerings Purportedly Backed by Real Estate and Diamonds (Release No. 2017-185, Sept. 19, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-185-0  [https://perma.cc/2WY2-EKY6] (“The Securities 
and Exchange Commission today charged a businessman and two companies with defrauding investors 
in a pair of so-called initial coin offerings (ICOs) purportedly backed by investments in real estate and 
diamonds.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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hopes that they will qualify as foreign offerings under Regulation S.
34
  
Second, some ICOs have offered utility tokens, arguing that they do not 
qualify as securities under the Howey test.35  Third, promoters have directed 
offerings not to the general public, but instead only to accredited investors, 
the wealthy individuals who qualify to invest in private securities.
 36
  This 
section will describe each workaround in turn.  First, though, a more 
detailed description of Howey is in order.   
The Howey test defines the catchall “investment contract” category of 
securities requiring registration under the Securities Act in the absence of 
an exemption from it.  There are three main elements.
37
  First, Howey 
requires that the investment be “solely from the efforts of others.”
38
  Courts 
have not interpreted “solely” literally, but instead have inquired as to 
whether “the efforts made by those other than the investor are the 
undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect 
the failure or success of the enterprise.”
39
 Second, Howey requires that there 
be an expectation of profit, which the Court defined as (1) capital 
appreciation resulting from the development of the initial investment or (2) 
participation in earnings resulting from the use of investors’ funds.”
40
 Third, 
an investment contract requires a “common enterprise.”
41
 The nuances of 
the Howey test could consume this entire article, but these basics suffice to 
orient the reader. The point is that securities law casts a broad net, reaching 
 
 
34. Lukas Hofer, Why Token Issuers Exclude U.S. Investors, ICO.LI (Oct. 13, 2019, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.ico.li/us-investors/ [https://perma.cc/UG36-GLH6]; see Offshore Offers and Sales, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 9632 (Feb. 25, 1998) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 and 249). 
35. Park, supra note 15. 
36. See Randolph A. Robinson III, The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion of 
Initial Coin Offerings, 85 TENN. L. REV. 897, 925 (2018). 
37. An additional element, only rarely at issue, requires that money be invested. 
38. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). 
39. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973). 
40. United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975). 
41. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. Courts agree that horizontal commonality, which looks at the 
relationships between an individual investor and the pool of other investors, meets the Howey test, but 
are less clear on whether the relationship between the investor and the promoter is enough to satisfy the 
common enterprise element.  See, e.g., SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2001); Teague v. Bakker, 
35 F.3d 978 (4th Cir. 1994); Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81 (2nd Cir. 1994); Curran v. Merrill 
Lynch, 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council Inc., 561 F. 2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977); 
Wasnowic v. Chi. Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972), aff’d without majority, 491 F.2d 
752 (3rd Cir. 1973). But see, e.g., SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 300 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2002); SEC v. 
Eurobond Exch. Ltd., 13 F.3d 1334 (9th Cir. 1994); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary Inc., 497 F. 2d 473 
(5th Cir. 1974). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/12
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just about every likely investment scheme. ICO entrepreneurs have spent 
countless hours and dollars trying to evade the reach of Howey, and thus of 
the SEC and U.S securities law.  Of course, the easiest way to avoid U.S. 
regulation is not to sell to U.S. citizens at all. 
 
III. BARRING U.S. CITIZENS FROM PURCHASING TOKENS 
 
First, some ICOs have tried to bar would-be U.S. investors from 
participating in the offering, in the hopes that they will qualify as foreign 
offerings under Regulation S.
42
  These offerings use technological 
mechanisms to help keep U.S. investors out. To ensure that U.S. investors 
are not participating, some coin offerors have started blocking U.S.-based 
IP addresses and requiring investors to show their passports.
43
 Startups are 
also using other measures to ensure that U.S.-based investors do not 
 
 
42. Andrew Henderson, 5 Reasons Every Crypto Investor Needs a Second Residency and Second 
Passport, NOMAD CAPITALIST (Oct. 13, 2019, 4:30 PM), 
https://nomadcapitalist.com/2018/04/06/reasons-crypto-investor-needs-second-residency-second-
passport/ [https://perma.cc/8MAA-AC79]. For example, although EOS maintains that its tokens are not 
securities, it has banned U.S. investors because of state regulations and blue-sky laws. Evelyn Cheng, 
This Hot Digital Currency Trend Is Minting Millions, But US Investors Aren't Allowed to Play, CNBC 
(July 18, 2017, 12:07 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/18/hot-digital-currency-trend-minting-
millions-off-limits-to-us-investors.html [https://perma.cc/V5EZ-WYRH]. 
43. Henderson, supra note 42. For example, four ICOs, iOlite, Celsius, ShoCard and Auctus will 
require investors to show their passports in order to screen-out U.S. investors, with iOlite and Celsius 
also blocking U.S.-based IP addresses for added protection. Initial coin offerings are no longer using 
clickwrap to screen out U.S.-based investors. The Monaco Visa ICO employed a clickwrap block so 
U.S. investors would not join.  Clickwrap agreements require the user to click a link before proceeding. 
Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps, and Browsewraps: How 
the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of the Horse, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 17; Dana-
Edwards, ICOs Are Not for US Citizens? Should ICOs Reject Self-Proclaimed US Citizens as a Way to 
Reduce Legal and Regulatory Risk?, STEEMIT (2017), https://steemit.com/icos/@dana-edwards/icos-
are-not-for-us-citizens-should-icos-reject-self-proclaimed-us-citizens-as-a-way-to-reduce-legal-and-
regulatory-risk  [https://perma.cc/WN7Y-BBNL].  The Cobinhood ICO also banned U.S. investors.  See 
COBINHOOD TERMS AND CONDITIONS 6.1 http://www.cobin-
hood.com/assets/terms/COBINHOOD_terms_n_conditions.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6RD-4CL7] (“The 
Website, the Platform and COB Tokens are not publicly offered for use to natural and legal persons, 
having their habitual residence or their seat of incorporation in the following countries: i) Canada; ii) 
People’s Republic of China; iii) the United States; iv) Taiwan; and v); and countries listed on OFAC 
sanctions lists (‘Restricted Areas’)”).  The belief among the crypto community is that this is not enough 
to stop the SEC from coming after coin issuers.  Anna Irrera & Michelle Price, Cryptocurrency Issuers 
Clean Up, Shun U.S. Investors as SEC Gets Tough, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2018, 2:17 PM) 
http://ca.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idCAKBN1GX2OX-OCATC [https://perma.cc/HSD2-
A3SK]. 
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participate in their ICOs, including enlisting “brokers and platforms that 
perform know-your-customer and anti-money-laundering due diligence to 
verify the identification and residency of interested investors.”
44
 These 
efforts are not foolproof
45
—for example, investors can use virtual private 
networks (VPNs) to mask their IP addresses
46
—but the efforts do enough to 
gesture towards compliance and at least potentially assuage regulators’ 
concerns.
47
 
 
IV. OFFERINGS TO U.S. PURCHASERS  
THAT ARE NOT “SECURITIES”—UTILITY TOKENS 
 
Not all ICO offerings have attempted to evade the reach of U.S. securities 
law by moving overseas.  There has been a concerted effort to develop 
public token offerings that are not considered securities offerings under the 
Howey test.  These token offerings are “utility tokens” or “app coins,” that 
is, tokens to be used for consumptive purposes, and whose primary purpose 
is not to be held for future profit.
48
 Utility tokens are more like a right to 
buy a future product or service than a right to participate in the profits of a 
future enterprise.  For example, Golem is a blockchain company that allows 
individuals to rent out their computer processing power on demand, similar 
 
 
44. Andrew Ramonas, No U.S. Investors Need Apply for Some Digital Coin Offerings, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.bna.com/no-us-investors-n73014463997/. 
45. See id. (“‘We cannot be sure that every new upcoming transaction is outside the U.S.,’ chief 
executive officer Ingus Staltmanis told Bloomberg BNA in an emailed statement.”). 
46. See Max Eddy, What Is a VPN and Why You Need One, PC MAG (Oct. 13, 2019, 4:45 PM), 
https://www.pcmag.com/article/352757/you-need-a-vpn-and-heres-why [https://perma.cc/MN65-
NU9T] (discussing how VPNs function to “mask[] your identity and location”). 
47. See William Suberg, Bancor Seeks to Exclude US Users From Trading Over Regulatory 
Uncertainty, Cointelegraph (June 19, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/bancor-seeks-to-exclude-
us-users-from-trading-over-regulatory-uncertainty [https://perma.cc/BUG2-9HXN]. 
48. Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss, Angela Moon, & Heekyong Yang, Global Cryptocurrency 
Crackdown Sparks Search For Safe Havens, WESTLAW J. COMPUT. & INTERNET, Dec. 15, 2017, at 9, 
2017 WL 6452835 at *2 (“Many U.S. startups thought they could avoid such scrutiny by selling ‘utility 
tokens,’ which gave buyers access to products or services rather than a stake in the company.”); see also 
Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the 
Democratization of Public Capital Markets, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 463, 493 (2019) (“Because [utility] 
tokens entitle the holder to use, consume, or access an online service or serve other functional purposes 
(for example, participating on a messaging platform or surfing the Internet without ads), elements of a 
consumption purpose are present.”). 
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to how Airbnb allows short-term lodging rental on demand.
49
 These 
transactions take place using GNT, a token that can also be traded on other 
exchanges.  While some individuals are buying and selling GNT for the 
purpose of using it to purchase processing power, the token at one point rose 
to a high 116 times its initial offering price.50 It is unlikely that increased 
demand for the service itself caused the bulk of that increase.
51
   
Professor Randolph Robinson likens utility tokens to “pre-paid coupons 
that will unlock value in yet to be built software programs or platforms.”
52
 
If you find this explanation of a utility token somewhat confusing, there is 
good reason.  Buying a utility token in an initial offering generally doesn’t 
make financial sense.  Nevertheless, many of these utility token offerings 
have had a speculative component—either because investors are betting that 
their use rights will go up in value, or because they do not understand that 
they are not receiving an equity interest in the offering.  
The market trend of reconfiguring tokens from equity offerings into so-
called consumptive goods faces two problems: 1) in general the public is 
buying tokens or coins not to use them, but as an investment, and 2) the SEC 
has reiterated that utility tokens are in fact securities, and therefore subject 
to regulation.   
The first problem with utility tokens is that they are disingenuous at best.  
A member of the general public participates in an ICO because she wants to 
make money.
53
 Yet utility tokens are by design not what Jonathan Rohr and 
 
 
49. Steve Buchko, What is Golem (GNT)? A Complete Guide to the Decentralized 
Supercomputer, COIN CENTRAL  (Dec. 7, 2018), http://coincentral.com/golem-gnt-beginners-guide/ 
[https://perma.cc/KA5X-N3PD]. 
50. Cali Haan, Alleged Price Calculation Errors at Tether Badly Skew Crypto Price Data on 
CoinMarketCap, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Aug. 6, 2018, 8:07 PM), 
https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2018/08/137412-alleged-price-calculation-errors-at-tether-badly-
skews-crypto-price-data-on-coinmarketcap/ [https://perma.cc/X734-QMW8]. 
51. As a second example, the STORJ ICO sold tokens to users that enable them to buy or rent 
cloud storage space and bandwidth.  It raised $30 million in its ICO.  Matthew May, What to Consider 
in an ICO, FORBES (Nov. 21, 2017, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesfinancecouncil/2017/11/21/what-to-consider-in-an-
ico/#9f2e6285c449 [https://perma.cc/XAB2-MEQT]. Max Middelman, Why Utility Tokens Will Not 
Make You Rich, MISSION STUDIOS (Oct. 22, 2018), https://medium.com/the-mission/why-utility-tokens-
will-not-make-you-rich-646312723104 [https://perma.cc/23W7-P4EC]. 
52. Robinson, supra note 36.   
53. Anna Irrera, Steve Stecklow, & Brenna Hughes Neghaiwi, Special Report: Backroom Battle 
Imperils $230 Million Cryptocurrency Venture, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2017, 6:06 PM), 
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Aaron Wright term investment tokens, which “bestow express economic 
rights on their holders.”
54
 The utility token buyer “invests” in a service that 
she likely has little interest in actually using.  Indeed, a year after its 
successful ICO, Digipulse is destroying all of its tokens because hardly any 
were being used.
55
 Its CEO, Normunds Kvilis, blogged that out of 320 sign-
ups in the previous six days, “only two people have actually used the DGPT 
token for its main purpose.  This indicates that the token is generally used 
to pursue quick gains from a speculative standpoint, rather than being used 
for its main purpose of service use.”
56
 In short, ICO entrepreneurs, in an 
effort to avoid the reach of securities laws entirely, have created offerings 
of dubious value that lack the traditional investor protections the securities 
laws afford.  No wonder the SEC is worried. 
The net effect of these two problems is that consumptive tokens are 
suboptimal digital assets which their promoters stripped of key investor 
protections like voting rights, in a futile effort to avoid regulation.   
 
V. NONPROFITS: THE SWISS FOUNDATION MODEL 
 
Several prominent ICOs have blended the first two approaches and 
launched overseas nonprofits to avoid the reach of U.S. securities laws. 
Tezos, Bancor, and Ethereum
57
 organized via nonprofits in Switzerland to 
evade the reach of U.S. securities law and the law of other jurisdictions.
58
  
 
 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bitcoin-funding-tezos-specialreport/special-report-backroom-battle-
imperils-230-million-cryptocurrency-venture-idUSKBN1CN35K [https://perma.cc/8HW8-6RRG]. 
54. See Rohr & Wright, supra note 29, at 52.  Rohr and Wright have offered an insightful and 
helpful framework for guiding the SEC in weighing which of these offerings should qualify as securities. 
55. Sam Town, Engineered Destruction: One Year Post-ICO, This Startup is Destroying All 
Issued Tokens Due to Market Speculation, CRYPTOSLATE (Aug. 7, 2018), 
https://cryptoslate.com/engineered-destruction-one-year-post-ico-this-startup-is-destroying-all-issued-
tokens-due-to-market-speculation/ [https://perma.cc/443Y-SW6R]. 
56. Normunds Kvilis, Digipulse — Past, Present and, Future, DIGIPULSE (Aug. 1, 2018), 
https://blog.digipulse.io/digipulse-past-present-and-future-5cb6e9c6455c. 
57. Brenna Hughes Neghaiwi, Top Swiss Cryptocurrency Lawyer Questions 'Stupid' ICO 
Structure, REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2018, 9:13 AM), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-swiss-crypto/top-swiss-
cryptocurrency-lawyer-questions-stupid-ico-structure-idUKKBN1FB1TM [https://perma.cc/Z7TL-
8G35]. 
58. Atkins, supra note 31 (“Of the 10 biggest proposed initial coin offerings—by which start-
ups raise funds by selling tokens—four have used Switzerland as a base . . . .”). 
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Early Swiss ICOs such as Tezos formed nonprofit foundations that offered 
tokens not for sale, but instead in exchange for nonprofit “donations.”
59
  
 
For example, Tezos’ offering documents called the contributions “a non-
refundable donation” and not a “speculative investment.”
60
 The theory is 
that if Tezos tokenholders truly donated money to a foundation, then the 
tokens were not securities under the Howey test.  These evasions may not 
be successful—the promoters were defendants in two class-action lawsuits 
seeking rescission and damages, claiming that they sold unregistered 
securities in the U.S.
61
 
Notably, Facebook’s new Libra Association, a consortium of powerful 
for-profit companies including Visa Inc., Mastercard Inc., PayPal Holdings 
Inc. and Uber Technologies Inc., is organized as a Swiss nonprofit. 
62
 Libra 
Association plans to launch a cryptocurrency whose value is tied to 
government-issued currencies,
63
 but these plans have spurred considerable 
governmental attention and resistance.
64
   
 
 
59. Irrera, Stecklow, & Neghaiwi, supra note 53.  Tezos founder Kathleen Breitman once likened 
Tezos tokens to a tote bag you’d receive in return for a donation to a public TV station. Gideon Lewis-
Kraus, Inside the Crypto World’s Biggest Scandal, WIRED (June 19, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/tezos-blockchain-love-story-horror-
story/?mbid=social_twitter&__twitter impression=true [https://perma.cc/D38R-RSB5]. 
60.  Irrera, Stecklow, & Neghaiwi, supra note 53. 
61. Anna Irrera & Steve Stecklow, Tezos Organizers Hit with Second Lawsuit Over 
Cryptocurrency Fundraiser, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2017, 5:58 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
bitcoin-tezos/tezos-organizers-hit-with-second-lawsuit-over-cryptocurrency-fundraiser-
idUSKBN1DF37L?il=0 [https://perma.cc/37ZP-4E8R]. 
62. Kate Rooney, The Fed is Looking into Facebook’s Libra Cryptocurrency as Powell Flags 
‘Serious Concerns’, CNBC (July 10, 2019, 2:10 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/10/powell-says-
facebooks-libra-cryptocurrency-raises-serious-concerns-such-as-money-laundering.html 
[https://perma.cc/N5YK-GMRW]; THE LIBRA ASS’N, https://libra.org/en-US/association/ 
[https://perma.cc/KCB4-U532] (“The Libra Association is an independent, not-for-profit membership 
organization, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland.”). 
63. AnnaMaria Andriotis, Peter Rudegeair & Liz Hoffman, Facebook’s New Cryptocurrency, 
Libra, Gets Big Backers, WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebooks-new-
cryptocurrency-gets-big-backers-11560463312 [https://perma.cc/QER7-69NZ]. 
64. Ryan Browne, Here’s Why Regulators Are So Worried About Facebook’s Digital Currency, 
CNBC (Oct. 13, 2019, 4:47 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/19/heres-why-regulators-are-so-
worried-about-facebooks-digital-currency.html [https://perma.cc/LGM5-VXCK]; David Concannon, 
Yvette D. Valdez & Stephen P. Wink, The Yellow Brick Road for Consumer Tokens: The Path to SEC 
and CFTC Compliance, in GLI - BLOCKCHAIN & CRYPTOCURRENCY REGULATION 101 (Josias Dewey 
ed., 2019), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/yellow-brick-road-for-consumer-tokens-path-to-
sec-cftc-compliance [https://perma.cc/9ZL3-KKWG]. 
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VI. SAFTS 
 
Finally, some promoters have directed offerings not to the general public, 
but instead only to accredited investors, the wealthy individuals who qualify 
to invest in private securities.
65
 The SAFT (simple agreement for future 
tokens) suggests that one way to avoid liability under the securities laws is 
to offer the investment opportunity exclusively to accredited investors, who 
are more sophisticated and better prepared to accept the risk.
66
 In other 
words, the SAFT promoters acknowledge that SAFTs are investment 
contracts subject to the 1933 Act, but argue that they qualify for exemption 
from registration because they are offered only to accredited investors.
67
 
SAFT investors fund developers who “develop [a] genuinely functional 
network, with genuinely functional utility tokens, and then deliver those 
tokens to the investors.  The investors may then resell the tokens to the 
public, presumably for a profit, and so may the developers.”
68
 The tokens 
themselves are merely “consumptive products,”
69
 and thus not subject to the 
reach of U.S. securities law.  Thus, accredited investors get in early in the 
investment phase of the SAFT.  The general public buys tokens at a point 
when they have only consumptive value.  The downside of this method is 
 
 
65. Usha Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain, 104 IOWA L. REV.  679, 725 (2019). 
66. Juan Batiz-Benet, Marco Santori & Jesse Clayburgh, The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant 
Token Sale Framework, SAFT PROJECT, 19 (Oct. 2, 2017), https://saftproject.com/static/SAFT-Project-
Whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKN2-RBWW]. The SAFT is modeled on the SAFE, the simple 
agreement for future equity.  The SAFE is a contract in a fledgling corporation that provides that an 
investor’s interest will convert automatically into equity if the company raises finances in the future, is 
sold, or goes public.  Joseph M. Green & John F. Coyle, Crowdfunding and the Not-So-Safe Safe, 102 
VA. L. REV. ONLINE 168, 172 (2016), 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/volumes/content/crowdfunding-and-not-so-safe-safe 
[https://perma.cc/XA4M-52E4]. SAFEs were created to offer a simple solution to the problem that often 
confronts early-stage entrepreneurs who needed to raise funds quickly and cheaply, without the time- 
and cost-intensive negotiations that surround venture financing and, increasingly, angel investing.  Id.  
67. Batiz-Benet et al., supra note 66, at 4. 
68. Id. at 1. 
69. Id.  Several platforms have used the SAFT framework, including Unikrn, a sports betting 
platform backed by Mark Cuban, and Kik, which raised $100 million in Ethereum to develop a new 
social internet platform.  See Form D, Securities and Exchange Commission, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1625681/000162568115000002/xslFormDX01/primary_doc.
xml [https://perma.cc/7YVR-DRRK]; Eugene Kim, Crypto Start-Ups are Trying to get Their House in 
Order Ahead of a Possible SEC Crackdown, CNBC (Oct. 12, 2017, 12:16 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/12/crypto-start-ups-turn-to-safts-for-ico s-raising-more-than-
350m.html [https://perma.cc/SX4H-L54Z].  
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that it perpetuates the-haves-versus-the-have-nots divide because only 
accredited investors can obtain equity under the SAFT model.   
 
VII. THIS ISN’T WORKING 
 
Regulators and blockchain enthusiasts are at an impasse. Entrepreneurs 
want to create and sell tokens without any regulation, and the SEC wants to 
tamp down ICOs because of the risk of fraud.  To overcome that impasse, 
each will need to face hard truths.  For the SEC, that hard truth is that the 
genie is out of the bottle.  Blockchain technology is agovernmental.  Bitcoin, 
itself a manifestation of the distrust in global financial institutions that 
emerged from the 2008 financial crisis, represents a fundamental challenge 
to governmental power as manifest in fiat currency.  The pressure on the 
SEC’s role as securities gatekeeper is intense.  For a while, at least, ICOs 
unlocked the power to raise funds from the general public to finance 
innovation.  Elizabeth Pollman and Jordan Barry elaborate on what they call 
“regulatory entrepreneurship,” a model where startups like Uber “move fast 
and break things,” relying on consumer pressure to force local regulators to 
accommodate their business models.
70
 Early ICO offerings likewise refused 
to wait for the securities law’s blessing.  Recent ICOs have not been able to 
harness public sentiment in their favor, however, because utility tokens are 
not as widespread as Uber or Airbnb.
71
  And the SEC has made clear that it 
views most token offerings as securities.  The choking effect of the SEC’s 
actions, coupled with the anti-regulatory ethos of blockchain, spells 
frustration, stalled capital raising, and hostility for regulators from the ICO 
community.
72
  
For their part, ICO enthusiasts need to understand the SEC’s perspective.  
For decades, the SEC has labored to protect the general public from the hype 
of risky offerings, worried that grandma will lose her savings to 
 
 
70. Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 
446 (2017). 
71. See Ankit Kumar, Hand in Glove: Start-ups and ICOs in 2019, TECHPLUTO (May 20, 2019), 
https://www.techpluto.com/hand-in-glove-start-ups-and-icos-in-2019/ [https://perma.cc/NCP3-
YUHZ]. 
72. Evelyn Cheng, The SEC Just Made It Clearer That Securities Laws Apply to Most 
Cryptocurrencies and Exchanges Trading Them, CNBC  (Mar. 7, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/07/the-sec-made-it-clearer-that-securities-laws-apply-to-
cryptocurrencies.html [https://perma.cc/5K5E-2HFS]. 
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unscrupulous promoters.  The SEC has targeted extremely troubling 
offerings.  To give some examples: AriseBank claimed to be the world’s 
first decentralized bank and began raising money through an ICO sale of its 
own cryptocurrency, AriseCoin, in November 2017.
73
 AriseBank made 
numerous false claims and advertisements, as well as misled investors,
74
 
promising that the coin would appreciate.
75
  
Or take PlexCorps, which raised about $15 million from thousands of 
investors through an ICO selling “PlexCoins,”
76
 and promised investors that 
they would receive a return of 1,324% in twenty-nine days. 
77
 The SEC 
alleged that PlexCoin had virtually no one working on the project, that 
proceeds were being used to fund its officers’ home decor projects, that it 
repeatedly misled investors about the value of the coin, and that it was an 
unregistered security trading on cryptocurrency exchanges.
78
 
Finally, the SEC alleged that REcoin Group Foundation, LLC,
79
 and one 
of its officers, Maksim Zaslavskiy, fraudulently misled hundreds of 
investors in violation of securities law, raising $300,000.
 80
 The SEC alleges 
that they made false representations about private investments they had thus 
far,
81
 including that investors could expect a return of 10-15%.
82
  Yet 
REcoin never assigned any coins to investors.
83
 On November 15, 2018, 
Zaslavskiy pleaded guilty to federal criminal charges in the Eastern District 
of New York.
84
 
 
 
73. Complaint at 1, SEC v. AriseBanks, No. 3:18-cv-00186 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2018). 
74. The complaint alleges that AriseBank never possessed any of the purported technology or 
assets, for example, the complaint asserts that AriseBank falsely claims that it purchased a 100-year old 
bank and its association with an AriseBank branded visa card. See id. at 2. 
75. Id. 
76. Complaint at 1, SEC v. PlexCorps, No. 1:17-cv-7007, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2016145 
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2017).  
77. Id. at 2. 
78. Id. at 1, 3.  
79. Complaint at 1, SEC v. RECoin Grp. Found., LLC, No. 1:17-cv-05725, (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 
2017). 
80. Id. at 2. 
81. Defendants claimed that they had raised $2 million, and later $4 million, when none had 
actually been raised. Id. 
82. Id. at 3. 
83. Id. 
84. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, E. Dist. of N.Y., Brooklyn Businessman Pleads Guilty 
to Defrauding Investors Through Two Initial Coin Offerings (Nov. 15, 2018) (on file at 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/brooklyn-businessman-pleads-guilty-defrauding-investors-
through-two-initial-coin [https://perma.cc/BC22-6TU3]). 
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There are signs that these three examples are merely the tip of the iceberg.  
A Wall Street Journal examination of offering documents from 1,450 ICOs 
found 271 with major red flags.
85
 These red flags included documents 
copied from earlier offerings, promises of guaranteed returns, and even 
missing or fake executive teams.
86
 The case of Denaro, described in the Wall 
Street Journal article, illustrates the grave fraud risks crypto offerings can 
pose for investors:  
“Jeremy Boker” is listed as a co-founder of Denaro, an 
online-payment project.  In investor documents for a public 
offering in March, which claimed to have raised $8.3 
million, Mr. Boker boasted of his cryptocurrency startup’s 
“powerhouse” team.  In his biography, he noted a 
“respectable history of happy clients” in consulting before 
he launched Denaro. 
In fact, Mr. Boker’s bio image was a stock photo, there 
is no evidence he exists and the rest of his team appears to 
be fictional, except for two freelancers who said they were 
paid by people unknown to them to market the project.
87
 
 
These examples highlight the problems the SEC confronts.  The 
spectacular success of early ICOs fed the enthusiasm of a host of blockchain 
entrepreneurs.
88
  But it also attracted unscrupulous individuals intent only 
on making a quick buck through fraud.
89
  The SEC is charged with 
protecting the investing public, and thus is understandably worried about 
these fraudsters.
90
  Right now, it can see no clear way to separate genuine 
offerings from fraudulent ones and is using the U.S. securities laws to tamp 
down the whole ICO market because of the rampant risks it presents.  
The second problem is that the SEC has rejected all the creative attempts 
to evade Howey’s reach.  SEC Chair Jay Clayton stated in December 2017, 
“Merely calling a token a ‘utility’ token or structuring it to provide some 
 
 
85. Shifflett & Jones, supra note 10. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. 
89. Shaanan Cohney, David Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff, & David Wishnick, Coin-Operated 
Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 594 (2019). 
90. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.  
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utility does not prevent the token from being a security.”
91
  Clayton further 
noted that offerings that “emphasize the potential for profits based on the 
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others to contain the hallmarks of a 
security under U.S. law.”
92
 At an SEC town hall, Clayton said:  “Much of 
what I have seen in the ICO . . . space, is a security offering . . .  I don’t 
know how much more clear I can be about it.”
93
  In a subsequent U.S. Senate 
hearing, he indeed was clearer, stating: “I believe every ICO I’ve seen is a 
security.”
94
 
The solution is simple: blockchain entrepreneurs should accept that they 
are offering securities, and work with regulators to come up with investor 
safeguards in the offering itself.  This suggestion will raise the hackles of 
the cryptoanarchist set, who entertain visions of a blockchain free from 
government regulation of any kind. But the history of internet regulation 
teaches us that governments inevitably will assert jurisdiction over the new 
spaces technology creates.
95
 Better to be part of the regulatory framework 
than resisting completely and having regulation thrust upon the blockchain 
without input from the community. 
 
VIII. REGULATION ISN’T PERDITION, IT’S SALVATION 
 
Conceding that token offerings are securities would likely strengthen 
ICOs immeasurably.  There’s always been a wink and a nod accompanying 
utility token offerings.  Their claims that the offerings are solely for 
 
 
91. Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-
clayton-2017-12-11 [https://perma.cc/E47W-ZGPU]. 
92. Id. 
93. Jack Mathis, ICOs are Securities, ‘Don’t Know How Much More Clear I Can Be’: SEC 
Chairman, CCN (June 14, 2018, 2:00 AM), https://www.ccn.com/icos-are-securites-dont-know-how-
much-more-clear-i-can-be-sec-chairman/ [https://perma.cc/FSY4-9ZTS].  The SEC has already said that 
payment tokens like Bitcoin and Ether are not securities.  Jonathan Shieber, SEC Says Ether Isn’t a 
Security, but Tokens Based on Ether Can Be, TECHCRUNCH (June 14, 2018), 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/06/14/sec-says-ether-isnt-a-security-but-tokens-based-on-ether-can-be/ 
[https://perma.cc/5SJD-CC7C].  The SEC has acknowledged that cryptocurrencies themselves may not 
be securities.  For example, Bill Hinman, Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance, while 
comparing Ether to Bitcoin, stated that “current offers and sales of Ether are not securities transactions.” 
94. Stan Higgins, SEC Chief Clayton: ‘Every ICO I’ve Seen Is a Security’, COINDESK (Feb. 6, 
2018), https://www.coindesk.com/sec-chief-clayton-every-ico-ive-seen-security 
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consumptive use ring hollow.  In general, people want to buy these token 
offerings to trade them, to speculate on their future value.
96
 If they were 
truly for consumptive value, developers could code nontransferability into 
the blockchain.  If tokens could not be transferred, there could be no 
possibility of a secondary market.   Currently, they do not.
97
 
A fundamental contradiction exists at the core of the utility token concept: 
scarcity determines value for assets, but for tokens or units of exchange to 
have value, people must be willing to spend them.  A classic, if homely, 
example is the babysitting cooperative that existed on Capitol Hill in the 
1970s.  Staffers created a kind of barter economy, where they would babysit 
in exchange for “scrip” that could be redeemed for babysitting services 
later.
98
  A “crisis” of sorts arose because the scrip became scarce, and people 
began to hoard, valuing the promise of future nights out over actually using 
the currency.
99
 Put simply, if everyone is buying tokens as speculative 
investments rather than to use them, then fewer people will actually use the 
service.  As the network effects spiral downward with fewer and fewer 
users, the service itself will cease to be viable. 
Summing up, here’s where we are.  Blockchain offerors contorted their 
offerings into utility tokens to avoid being labeled as securities.  This 
“solution” is unsustainable for two reasons.   First, the SEC has rejected the 
argument.
100
 Second, it’s keeping the general public from an equity interest 
in these exciting offerings.  At best, with the SAFT offerings, accredited 
investors receive the benefits of investment, while the have-nots remain on 
the outside.
101
  
I offer a radically different approach.  Rather than trying to dream up 
increasingly contorted coin offerings that evade the Howey test, the cleanest 
 
 
96. Bill Carmody, The Top Initial Coin Offerings to Watch in 2018, INC. (Nov. 17, 2017), 
http://www.inc.com/bill-carmody/top-10-initial-coin-offerings-icos-to-watch-heading-into-2018.html 
[https://perma.cc/84TC-NU28]. 
97. See FENNIE WANG, PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI, ALEXIS COLLOMB & KLARA SOK, FINANCING 
OPEN BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEMS: TOWARD COMPLIANCE AND INNOVATION IN INITIAL COIN 
OFFERINGS 34-35 (2019), https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02046793/document 
[https://perma.cc/S9SX-EBR3] (describing why, despite its feasibility, the option of encoding 
nontransferability into the blockchain is “unlikely to be . . . actually applied in practice”). 
98. Joan Sweeney & Richard J. Sweeney, Monetary Theory and the Great Capitol Hill Baby 
Sitting Co-op, 9 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 86, 87 (1977). 
99. Id. at 87. 
100. See supra Section II.B. 
101. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68. 
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move would be to acknowledge that any investment tokens and any 
offerings of utility or consumptive tokens that cannot be exercised right 
away (that is, those redeemable only for a service yet to be built) are all 
securities.  Indeed, I would go farther and label functional utility tokens as 
securities as well.  As I have already described, utility tokens are suboptimal 
offerings whose sole raison d’etre is to avoid the Howey test.102  As I argue 
below, calling token offerings “securities” offers more benefits than costs, 
and makes utility tokens practically obsolete.  The downside, from the 
promoter’s perspective, is this move would cede SEC power to regulate.  
That’s not much of a downside, considering that U.S. ICOs are basically in 
a state of paralysis now, trapped in regulatory limbo.   
More importantly, conceding tokens’ status as securities would empower 
entrepreneurs to conduct offerings that look more like traditional offerings, 
giving voting rights and distribution rights to the public in a way that some 
communities are already experimenting with.
103
   Crucially, it would give 
the public what it wants: a real chance to invest in this innovative technology 
in a manner previously only available to the wealthy.  Ultimately, 
government regulation is a path to standardized disclosure that allows 
blockchain entrepreneurs to access the general public.  And that’s where the 
money is.   
 
IX. THE PATH FORWARD 
 
The SEC staff have issued a “Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ 
Analysis of Digital Assets” to help analyze whether a digital asset qualifies 
as a security.
104
   But this framework merely clarifies the application of the 
law—it does not attempt to flex to adapt securities law to blockchain 
technology.  The SEC’s immediate concern with ICO is fraud.  These 
traditional protection mechanisms are not, however, the only mechanisms 
available to address the problems of offering and post-offering fraud.  This 
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Analysis of Digital Assets,” SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-
statement/statement-framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets [https://perma.cc/6WWG-
SHS7]. 
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section gestures (but no more than gestures) toward a path for U.S. securities 
offerings on the blockchain.  
There are mechanisms that could assuage the SEC’s concerns, grant 
entrepreneurs access to new sources of capital, and allow the general public 
to participate as investors in early stage blockchain ventures.  In another 
work,
105
 I identify venture capital financial contracting mechanisms—some 
of which ICOs already employ—that could make crowdfunding viable.  I 
will here suggest that tailoring some already common mechanisms—such 
as an escrow—may enable them to meet the SEC’s concerns.  
To appreciate how an escrow might work, it helps to start with the 
fundamental problems each new venture seeking outside investors faces.  
Two are disadvantages a potential investor has vis-à-vis the entrepreneur.  
Investors face an information asymmetry—entrepreneurs will always paint 
the venture’s prospects in glowing terms, and investors do not know 
whether to believe rosy projections or treat them as mere puffery.
106
  
Similarly, investors risk agency costs—the danger that the entrepreneur will 
shirk or slack, and fail to do the work needed to make the project a 
success.
107
  Finally, both parties suffer from uncertainty—neither investor 
nor entrepreneur knows what the future holds.   
The escrow is a mechanism for addressing these problems.  Put simply, 
an escrow involves a trusted third party (a bank or similar agent) that holds 
funds for a period of time and allows payouts only upon the fulfillment of 
certain pre-arranged conditions.
108
    
Currently, some ICO promoters implement an escrow to address a 
specific concern.  ICOs often include in the blockchain code a vesting 
schedule, tying up their tokens so they cannot be sold at once.
109
  This 
feature does offer investors some protection—otherwise an unscrupulous 
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promoter could sell the public tokens on the promise of building a network, 
and then immediately sell their own tokens and exit stage right without ever 
having built the platform.  The self-imposed vesting schedule protects 
against that risk of a quick scam—if the promoter must wait to sell her 
tokens for a period of months or even years, then she has to work to make 
the network viable.  Otherwise her tokens will be worthless by the time she 
can sell them.    
ICO promoters could, using this same principle, create a real-life escrow 
for the funds raised at a financial institution.  They could articulate key 
milestones in the development of their project, and tie funding to the 
achievement of these milestones.  They could, in short, accomplish via 
escrow the staged financing common in the venture capital world.  With 
their funds securely housed in escrow, the company would not face the risk 
of running out of funding (as long as it made good on its promises).  At the 
same time, investors would reduce agency costs, uncertainty, and 
information asymmetry by delaying some payouts until the company had 
met its milestone requirements. 
Staged financing is but one example of how an escrow, coupled with the 
voting rights made possible when the tokens sold in an ICO are 
acknowledged to be securities, can protect investors and empower 
entrepreneurs.  This simple concept of an escrow is a powerful one. By 
allowing for funds to be securely amassed, but not dispersed, it can 
simultaneously reassure the entrepreneur that funds are available, while at 
the same time leaving the investors with some strings to pull. 
While there is much more to say on these topics, the goal of this piece is 
not to offer detailed solutions.  Instead, this piece has meant chiefly to 
articulate the problem ICOs now present, and to suggest that both the 
regulator and the regulated need to acknowledge the perspective of the other 
side.  On the part of ICO promoters, that truth is that circumventing 
securities regulation is a losing game, one not worth playing.  Regulation 
offers legitimacy and the prospect of larger capital markets.   On the part of 
the SEC, the hard truth is that ICOs represent a persistent hunger for easier 
ways to access capital than the status quo—and that creative investor 
mechanisms may be readily implemented to respond that need.  The best 
way forward is regulation that fosters markets precisely because it protects 
investors from fraud, while allowing the general public the chance to invest 
in private markets.  
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